Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Non-foundationalist epistemology' and 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8616 How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
8617 Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8618 Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
188 Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]