Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Truly Understood' and 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study''

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27 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
10631 If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624 The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629 If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
10628 The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622 The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10626 Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10630 Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627 Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
188 Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]