Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Statesman', 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations' and 'Principia Ethica'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato]
No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato]
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato]