138 ideas
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| 16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| 17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| 4955 | Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke] |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| 10559 | Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta] |
| 10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
| 4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
| 17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
| 8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
| 10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
| 4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| 14896 | Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 17647 | Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam] |
| 16995 | Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke] |
| 17047 | If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke] |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| 5450 | For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner] |
| 17055 | Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke] |
| 16997 | An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke] |
| 17045 | De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke] |
| 17030 | Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke] |
| 16955 | Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett] |
| 16996 | Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke] |
| 13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames] |
| 12100 | An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt] |
| 16991 | No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke] |
| 11867 | If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins] |
| 12018 | Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G] |
| 17046 | Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke] |
| 8274 | Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke] |
| 17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
| 17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
| 11880 | Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P] |
| 4797 | Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos] |
| 17037 | Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
| 16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
| 9386 | The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke] |
| 2408 | Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers] |
| 4960 | "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke] |
| 4966 | Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke] |
| 13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke] |
| 13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames] |
| 16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
| 16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
| 16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
| 17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
| 4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
| 7761 | Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan] |
| 7693 | Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette] |
| 5821 | Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam] |
| 14068 | If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke] |
| 10436 | A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
| 4953 | We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke] |
| 4961 | It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke] |
| 16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| 8259 | Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe] |
| 16989 | Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke] |
| 4947 | A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke] |
| 13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames] |
| 17048 | Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke] |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| 4948 | Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke] |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| 4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
| 7430 | Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke] |
| 7867 | If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau] |
| 3228 | Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey] |
| 5832 | Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP] |
| 4968 | Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke] |
| 16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
| 17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
| 5822 | The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke] |
| 17033 | We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke] |
| 4689 | Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn] |
| 17504 | Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam] |
| 17035 | We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke] |
| 16988 | Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG] |
| 17029 | It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke] |
| 14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
| 17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
| 17053 | Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke] |
| 4964 | 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke] |
| 6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 9387 | The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke] |
| 17054 | Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke] |
| 17057 | Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 4965 | Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 17050 | Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke] |
| 17049 | 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke] |
| 17051 | The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke] |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |