65 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| 14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |