Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism' and 'The Inessential Indexical'

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36 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E]
The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E]
We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E]
We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]