35 ideas
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 10147 | The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10148 | Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10149 | Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10150 | The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10146 | Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 10158 | A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10162 | Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10159 | Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10160 | Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10161 | If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10156 | 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10155 | Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 299 | What is fine is always difficult [Plato] |
| 297 | What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato] |
| 298 | While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato] |