Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Statesman', 'What is Philosophy?' and 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato]
No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]