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All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)' and 'Nicomachean Ethics'

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308 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel]
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel]
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel]
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel]
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel]
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel]
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel]
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel]
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel]
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel]
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel]
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]