68 ideas
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |