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All the ideas for 'The Statesman', 'Powers' and 'Logical Properties'

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato]
No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn]
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn]
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn]