96 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |