33 ideas
| 192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
| 8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
| 20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
| 20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
| 202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
| 193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
| 200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
| 197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
| 188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
| 204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |