41 ideas
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |