Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philebus', 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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43 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant]
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]