Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Every Thing Must Go' and 'The World as Will and Idea'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


133 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer]
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer]
Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross]
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross]
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross]
Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross]
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross]
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross]
The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer]
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer]
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross]
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer]
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner]
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross]
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross]
If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer]