116 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
7846 | Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
20107 | How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche] |
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
20352 | Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
20379 | Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche] |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
20123 | First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
20105 | Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
20376 | We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche] |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
22500 | Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche] |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
20128 | Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
22503 | Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
8041 | The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche] |
20135 | Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
20353 | The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
20113 | Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche] |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
22475 | Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
22476 | Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
20104 | Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche] |
7847 | Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
9782 | Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek] |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
20102 | Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche] |
20106 | Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski] |
20124 | Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche] |
20367 | Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche] |
20371 | Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
20108 | Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |