44 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |