Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Euthydemus', 'The Value Problem' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
19735 Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16120 Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19734 If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
303 Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19733 Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
6248 Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
302 What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6238 We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
6239 We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
6240 The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
6242 We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
6247 Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
6244 Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
6243 As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
301 Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6246 My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
305 Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6241 Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6245 That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
6251 The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
6250 We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6249 If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]