39 ideas
16123 | Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato] |
16124 | No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato] |
16125 | To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
5961 | The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
283 | The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato] |
282 | Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato] |
281 | The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato] |
22559 | Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |
279 | Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato] |