Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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48 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]