Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Euthydemus', 'Intuitionism and Formalism' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16120 Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
303 Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
302 What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
301 Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
305 Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]