66 ideas
12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |