Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sophist', 'Knowledge by Agreement' and 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato]
Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato]
The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch]
Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch]
Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch]
Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch]
Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch]
A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch]
Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch]
Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch]
Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch]