58 ideas
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
6493 | We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |