Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Timaeus', 'Problems of Knowledge' and 'works'

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63 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato]
The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]