30 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |