25 ideas
| 1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
| 11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
| 20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
| 5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
| 5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
| 1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
| 1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
| 1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
| 1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |