74 ideas
| 19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| 19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
| 19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| 19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
| 19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
| 19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| 19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| 19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
| 19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
| 19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
| 19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
| 19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| 19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| 19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
| 19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| 19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| 19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| 19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| 19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
| 19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
| 19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
| 19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
| 19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
| 19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
| 19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
| 19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
| 19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
| 19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
| 19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
| 19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
| 19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
| 19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
| 19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
| 1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| 19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
| 19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
| 19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |