78 ideas
| 14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
| 14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
| 14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
| 14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
| 14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
| 14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
| 14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
| 14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
| 14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
| 14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| 14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| 14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| 14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| 14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
| 14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
| 14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
| 14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
| 14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
| 14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
| 14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
| 14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| 14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |