60 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |