22 ideas
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R] |
13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R] |
13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R] |
13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |