109 ideas
13310 | Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca] |
13295 | Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca] |
13317 | Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca] |
13293 | What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca] |
13309 | That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca] |
13313 | Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca] |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
13297 | To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca] |
13307 | If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
21399 | Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
13325 | Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca] |
22239 | Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen] |
13294 | We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca] |
13299 | Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca] |
13300 | It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca] |
13321 | Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca] |
13292 | Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca] |
13303 | A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca] |
13302 | Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca] |
13301 | We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca] |
13323 | The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca] |
13318 | Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca] |
13324 | Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca] |
13305 | Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca] |
13308 | It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca] |
13312 | Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca] |
13315 | To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca] |
13290 | One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca] |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
13322 | Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca] |
13298 | Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca] |
13319 | If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca] |
13320 | Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca] |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
13311 | Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca] |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |