Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Gorgias', 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus]
Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus]
If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus]
Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus]