Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philebus', 'talk' and 'works'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]