Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'Evidence' and 'A Priori'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]