48 ideas
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |