53 ideas
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |