98 ideas
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| 23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| 24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
| 24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
| 23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
| 23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
| 23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
| 23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
| 23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
| 23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
| 23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
| 23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
| 23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
| 24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
| 23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
| 23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
| 23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
| 23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
| 23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
| 23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
| 23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
| 23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
| 23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
| 23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
| 23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
| 23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
| 23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
| 23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
| 23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
| 24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
| 24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
| 24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
| 24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
| 20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |