28 ideas
11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |