Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philebus', 'Action' and 'Ars Magna'

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15845 It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
19369 Lull's combinatorial art would articulate all the basic concepts, then show how they combine [Lull, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9867 It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
9865 Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
15857 Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
14503 If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
4447 If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
15856 A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
374 If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
389 How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
390 If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
391 The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
392 Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
393 Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
385 Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
387 A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
373 Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
379 The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
371 Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
376 Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
382 It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
381 We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
386 Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
388 Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
377 If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
378 A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
19371 Nine principles of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory [Lull, by Arthur,R]