48 ideas
192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |