78 ideas
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |