77 ideas
| 14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
| 14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
| 14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
| 14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
| 14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
| 14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
| 14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
| 14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
| 14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
| 14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
| 14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 1212 | Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch] |
| 14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
| 14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
| 14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
| 14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
| 14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
| 14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
| 14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
| 14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
| 14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
| 14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
| 14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| 14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |