Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Pragmatism and Deflationism' and 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]