56 ideas
15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |