13 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |