Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'The Disorder of Things' and 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory''

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26 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
5960 When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]