20 ideas
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |