16 ideas
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
| 5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |